



Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Burden of Insecurity Challenges in Nigeria: A Reflection on Cattle Rustling and Armed Banditry in Katsina State

By

ABDULLAHI Mu'awiyya

**Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Federal University Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria.**

Abstract

This study examines the roles of civil society organizations (CSOs) in mitigating the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state. The study is anchored within the Nesbit's typology of NGOs/CSOs activities in peacebuilding process. Data was generated from the primary and secondary sources. The study administered 384 questionnaires across eight (8) local government areas (LGAs) purposely selected for the study. In-depth Interviews were also conducted with 12 CSOs' members using a semi-structured questionnaire across the LGAs. The study used content and descriptive approaches for data analysis. The findings revealed that forty-eight (48) CSOs engaged in advocacy, policy, relief/aid, transformation, and self-defence activities. The CSOs generated funds from internal, community contributions, and external sources. They used different strategies to impact positively in curbing the challenges of insecurity. However, they faced challenges of inadequate funding, shortage of personnel and transportation facilities, threats, and fears to be kidnapped or killed in the course of their activities. The study concluded that the CSOs have tremendously contributed and improved peaceful conditions of the affected communities in the LGAs. Thus, recommended that the international, national, state and other donor agencies should direct support and assistance to strengthen the CSOs' initiatives and capabilities towards addressing the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state.

Keywords: Civil Society Organizations, Cattle Rustling, Armed Banditry, Insecurity, Katsina State, Nigeria



1. Introduction

Civil society involves the collective actions of citizens in a public domain, expressing their ideas, interests and preference to share information, make demands, hold officials accountable and promote peace, security and functioning of the state (Diamond, 1999). OECD (2009) sees civil society as a collection of multiple associations representing different interests through which the society is voluntarily organized. This comprises the community-based and village associations, faith-based, professional, human right, hunters and farmers associations, labour unions and so on. Kumar (2007) further noted that civil societies are those associations where people interact to achieve a greater peace and sustain unity through negotiating peace among the divide ethnic communities in case of any insecurity or conflict outbreak. Rupesingle & Anderlini (1998) believed that civil society play crucial roles in resolving insecurity problems, especially through dialogue and negotiating beyond the parties' interests to meet the both side basic requirements. Specifically, that civil societies have better knowledge of the conditions, the parties involved and the ability to engage them in dialogue more than the government or external actors.

This indicated the greatest quest of civil societies in search for peace and security within their immediate environments. It is important to note that people are always conscious about the effects of insecurity on their lives, properties and the environment where they live. For that reason, many communities through civil society initiatives have sought different strategies aimed at mitigating the problem of insecurity whenever they occurred. Although, insecurity is an unavoidable product of human interrelationships, but its magnitude over the last two decades threatens the peace, security and stability of almost every part of Nigeria. And since then, the issue of insecurity has become a major concern of citizen, especially across all geo-political zones within the northern parts of the country.

For instance, the Boko Haram insurgency in northeast, indigene/settlers and herders/farmers crises in northcentral as well as the cattle rustling and armed banditry in northwest have appeared to be the most alarming insecurity challenges in the region. The detrimental effects of cattle rustling and armed banditry were felt in all the northwestern states, owing to the nature of boundaries configuration that connects them, which provides a comfortable dens for the rustlers/bandits to operate. International Crisis Group (2020) noted that Kamuku Forest in



Kaduna State, Dansadau Forest in Zamfara State, and Rugu Forest, well known as Dajin Rugu that encircled Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara states are the major hidden camps of the rustlers/bandits from where they planned, organized, and launched their attacks.

Cattle rustling means violent stealing of cattle by armed groups, which leaves behind their victims with the pain of raping, killing, and destroying their properties (Sanusi, n.d.). Bello & Kabiru (2021) defined cattle rustling as the violent stealing of grazing livestock by criminals using dangerous weapons to execute their crime. Harbum & Wallensteen referred cattle rustling as the planning, organizing, or attempting to steal livestock from individuals or communities in which the thefts are accompanied by dangerous weapons (Vernon & Nyamongo, 2020). Bunei, McElwee & Smith (2016) defined cattle rustling as a process in which individuals plan, organize, and forcefully thief livestock from the grazing field for commercial gain. All the reviewed definitions above have acknowledged the existence of violence and application of weapons in stealing cattle, which explained the nature and character of cattle rustling in Katsina state.

On the other hand, armed banditry means threatening people with arms by thugs to dispossess their possessions for the group advantages (Okoli & Abubakar, 2021). Armed banditry further implies a group of well-equipped rural outlaws involved in illegal activities like raiding, raping, kidnapping, and stealing for their benefits (Sanusi, n.d.). Garba (2021) sees armed banditry as the use of weapons by a gang of criminals to attack less protected remote communities through violent threats aimed at raping, stealing, abducting, extorting, and killing inspired by the cultural, socio-economic and political motives. Armed banditry is characterized by robbing agricultural produce, highways attacks and looting of villages, rustling cattle, abduction, raping and killing some affected victims (Udosen & Uwak, 2021). Armed banditry in Katsina has corresponded with all the aforementioned features of the scholarly definitions attributed to the term.

Cattle rustling and armed banditry are therefore characterized by the excessive sexual abuse, kidnapping, looting, killing, displacement and destruction of properties. For instance, in 2013 alone, 60,000 cattle were rustled and lost 300 lives. By 2015, the human casualties was recorded at 2,991 and 64,830 rustled cattle, with many people displaced across Northern Nigeria (Egwu, 2016). It is also in record that about 8,000 people died during the period of Covid-19 lockdown across the Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna and Katsina



states. Over 30,000 people, mostly women and children were displaced along the Nigeria-Niger international borders (Attah et al., 2021). In Katsina state, the rustlers/bandits' attacks killed 50 people in April, 2020; 18 in May, 2020 and 60 in June, 2020. They raped women, looted shops, rustled over 200 cattle and seized the Covid-19 palliatives shared in the communities. The operations lasted for over 5 hours without the intervention of the security personnel (Attah et al., 2021). Farmers have no access to their farmlands. This condition has created serious shortage of livestock supply and price hike in farm products across the state (Usman & Ahmed, 2021).

These devastating effects have influence many scholars, including: Adi & Onyebuchi (2020); Attah et al. (2021); Bashir et al. (2018); Ladan, & Usman (2020); Ladan (2015); Ladan (2019); Mohammed & Alimba (2016); Olaniyan & Yahaya (2016); Rosenje & Adeniyi (2021); Usman & Ahmed (2021) and Yahaya & Bello (2020) to concentrated their studies on the roles of the governments in tackling the problems of rustling/banditry, thereby neglected the efforts of other stakeholders. The civil society organizations (CSOs) who serves voluntarily as the promoters of peace at both local, national and international levels have not received much attention in all the affected states. Despite the difficulty associated with finding effective mechanism capable of addressing the insecurity challenges in Nigeria as a whole.

Hence, this study aims to examine the efforts of CSOs in mitigating the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state. It is imperative to note that Lederach (1997) was the first person to established and shifted focus from the governmental role to the potential efforts of CSOs in providing welfare services and promoting peace. He viewed their involvement as a prerequisite for sustainable peace in response to the inability of the governments to cover all societal activities effectively. Therefore, this study attempts to answer questions such as: What are the activities of CSOs? How do they source funds? What are the strategies used? Have their efforts made impact so far? What are the challenges faced in curbing the insecurity challenges? The major structures of the study comprise theoretical foundation, methodology, result and discussion, conclusion and recommendations.

1.2 Theoretical Foundation

This study is situated within the Nesbit's typology of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) activities. Unlike Lederach's model of peacebuilding, Nesbit categorized the NGOs/CSOs activities in a short/ad-hoc and long/systemic through the



hands-off and hands-on approaches. However, it is important to stressed that it was Lederach's paradigm shift that led to a greater acceptance of local NGOs/CSOs in peacebuilding process (Paffenholz, 2014). Thus, acknowledging their significant role, Nesbit (2003) introduced a typology to guide the activities of NGOs/CSOs in peacebuilding process.

Table 1. Typology of NGOs/CSOs Activities

Scope		
AD-HOC		SYSTEMIC
Short-term and quick-fix actions.		Long-term measures to transform the structures supporting conflict.
Method		
HANDS-OFF	Advocacy	Policy
Non-direct service delivery.	Early warning systems and gathering information. Attracting media attention to conflict zones. Encouraging global action and persuading conflicting parties to engage in peace negotiations.	Human rights lobbying. Rights of children and women. Research on root causes of conflict. Fundraising, resource mobilization and Democratization.
HANDS-ON	Relief/Aid	Transformation
Direct service delivery.	Foodstuff, relief materials, medical and refugee camps' services, humanitarian aid, etc.	Justice, retribution, spiritual and physical healing. Trauma counselling and peace education. Facilitating dialogue between conflicting parties. Capacity building and developing local institutions.

Source: Adopted from Nesbit (2003).

From the table above, Nesbit (2003) advanced four activities of NGOs/CSOs in transforming conflict or insecurity. In the first category, NGOs/CSOs engage in advocacy and policy activities. Advocacy is an ad-hoc style through the hands-off method, focused mainly around the pre-conflict stage as a preventive measure (see Table 1). The hands-off method also has a systemic style involving long-term effort through the policy implementation process. At this level, NGOs/CSOs engage in a campaign, lobbying, and public enlightenment regarding the contending issues. It can be campaigned against women abuse and children's right. Influencing



the governments' policies or lobbying to sponsor research on the root causes of the insecurity to find suitable preventive strategies.

The second category involved what Nesbit (2003) termed the hands-on method as both ad-hoc and systemic. At all the levels, NGOs/CSOs engage in direct service delivery. In the ad-hoc approach, NGOs/CSOs involve in providing foodstuff, medical services, shelters/refugee camps and other humanitarian support to the victims. The systemic aspect aims at transforming the whole insecurity issues through dialogue, justice and retribution, peace education, capacity building, and reforming local institutions, etc. Therefore, these approaches will enable the study to locate the various activities of NGOs/CSOs and examine the strategies, impacts and challenges faced in transforming the insecurity challenges in Katsina state.

1.3 Research Methodology

The study employed a survey research design using questionnaires and in-depth interviews as instruments for data collection. The section is divided into subheadings as follows: Study population, sampling method, Method of data collection and analysis.

1.3.1 Study Population

Katsina state has 34 local government areas (LGAs) spread across 3 senatorial zones (Katsina north, central and south). The insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry are more popular in the 2 senatorial zones (central and south). The worst affected areas within Katsina central comprises: Batsari, Dan-Musa, Jibia, and Safana LGAs. In Katsina south, the areas include: Dan-Dume, Faskari, Kankara, and Sabuwa LGAs. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2018), the total population size of the 8 LGAs purposively selected to study was 1,886,300 (see Table 2 below).

1.3.2 Sampling Method

For suitability and accuracy, a small sampling method advanced by Krejcie & Morgan (1970) was employed to establish the required sample size for administering questionnaires across the selected LGAs, using the formula as follows: $S = X^2 NP (1 - P) \div d^2 (N - 1) + X^2 P (1 - P)$ to arrive at 384 sampling size. The table below provided more details:

Table 2. Required sample size for questionnaires' administration

State	District	LGAs	Pop. Size	Pop	S/Size	Retrieved	Un-
-------	----------	------	-----------	-----	--------	-----------	-----



Zone			(%)				Retrieved
Katsina	Katsina	Batsari	280,600	15	58	54	4
	Central	Dan-Musa	152,800	8	31	30	1
		Jibia	226,000	12	46	39	7
		Safana	250,000	13	50	50	0
	Katsina	Dan-Dume	196,200	10	38	34	4
	South	Faskari	262,400	14	54	47	7
		Kankara	328,400	18	69	58	11
		Sabuwa	189,900	10	38	36	2
Total	2	8	1,886,300	100	384	348	36

Note: LGAs = Local Government Areas; Pop = Population; and, % = Percentages; S= Sample

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

1.3.3 Method of Data Collection

A field survey method was adopted for data collection. To that effect, 384 questionnaires structured based on open and closed-ended questions were designed. For the former, space was provided to allow the respondents to express their opinions in hand written. In the latter, three Likert measurement scales (agreed, disagreed, and neutral) were used, which enables the respondents to choose their options accordingly. The questionnaires were administered appropriately as instruments for data collection across LGAs purposively selected for the study. At the end, 91%, equal to 348 questionnaires were successfully retrieved for the analysis (see Table 2).

The study also conducted in-depth interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire with at least 1 member of CSOs from each LGA. The Interviewed Respondents (IR) was used to code the participants (IR1-IR12) for easy analysis. See more details in table below:

Table 3. Interviewees' Local Government Area, Position, Date conducted, and Code

S/N0	Senatorial Zone	Local Gov't Area	Position	Code
1.	Katsina City	Katsina	Chairman Concern Youths Forum.	IR1
2.	Katsina Central	Batsari	Co-ordinator Dangote Foundation.	IR2
3.			Batsari Local Government Forum Secretary.	IR3
4.		Dan-Musa	Chairman Mai-Nasara Foundation.	IR4
5.			Leader of the Orphan Charity Foundation.	IR5
6.		Jibia	Jibia Desk Officer on Community Information; Advocacy Initiative & Gender Base Violence.	IR6
7.		Safana	Nigeria Red Cross.	IR7



8.	Katsina South	Dan-Dume	Acting Chairman Human Rights Access International.	IR8
9.		Faskari	Hunters Group Organization.	IR9
10.			Faskari Local Government Youths Forum Chairman.	IR10
11.		Kankara	Vigilante Group Secretary.	IR11
12.		Sabuwa	Vigilante Group Leader.	IR12

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

1.3.4 Data Analysis

The study adopted content and descriptive analyses. The qualitative data generated from in-depth interviews were transcribed and subjected to content analysis using themes. Regarding the questionnaires, the data from open-ended questions were also content analysed. The closed-ended questions were subjected to descriptive analysis using tables, graphs, and percentages.

1.4 Results and Discussion of Findings

This section is divided into the following sub-themes: The degree of respondents' awareness about the CSOs' efforts; names and activities of CSOs; strategies/tactics; source of funds; Impacts of CSOs' activities and the challenges faced in curbing the insecurity problems of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state.

1.4.1 Respondents' Awareness on CSOs Efforts in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

The graphs below demonstrated the degree of respondents' awareness of the CSOs' activities in curbing the insecurity challenges across the local government areas (LGAs) and Katsina state.




Figure 1: Percentages of Respondents' awareness on CSOs' efforts at LGAs



Source: Field Survey, 2023.




Figure 2: Percentages of Respondents' awareness on the CSOs' efforts in Katsina state

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Figure 2 above indicated that 52% of the respondents in Katsina state acknowledged the efforts of CSOs in curbing the insecurity challenges, while 39% respondents were unaware, and 9% were neutral. See Figure 1 for a summary of the respondents' awareness across LGAs.

1.4.2 Names and Activities of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

This part established 48 names of CSOs engaged in curbing the insecurity challenges in Katsina state. Their activities are categorized based on the Nesbit's typology of NGOs/CSOs' activities (see Table 1). However, the study found "self-defence approach" as another category of CSOs' activities. The tables below illustrate the names and their activities accordingly.

Table 4. Name and Advocacy Activities of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

Name	Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ani Foundation; Attau Foundation; Society for Human Development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocacy for peace and educational support.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Batsari Local Government Development Forum. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enlightenment and organizing prayers.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Campaign for Peace Initiatives; Batsari First; Green Light Foundation; Katsina Consultative Forum. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information sharing and sensitizations. Community engagement with stakeholders on security issues.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Batsari Consultative Forum; Jibia People Forum; Coalition of Civil Society Organizations; Faskari Youths Forum. • Concern Society on Security Jibia; Young Female Fellowship; Fityanul Islam; Darika Awareness Forum; Trade Union; Muryar Talaka Awareness Association. • Faskari Concern Citizen. • Women Awareness Organization; Gender Development Initiative; Darika Awareness Forum; Izala Youth Forum; Fityanul-Islam. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocacy visits, providing information to security personnel, youth training, community mobilization, and public awareness programs. • Public enlightenment, preaching, and awareness campaign about the effects of rustling/banditry. • Organizing interactive sessions and media mobilizations. • Calling for free education, preaching and orientations for peace. Sensitization and engaging in other religious activities.
---	--

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Table 5. Name and Policy Activities of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

Name	Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Association of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives; Miyetti Allah Kyautar Hore; All Farmers Association of Nigeria; Community Vanguard Organization. • Coalition of Civil Society Organizations. • Women Awareness Organization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advice and calling government and security personnel attention. • Engaging agencies responsible for providing security. Dragging the parties to court where necessary. • Sensitizing government and communities about the causes and possible solutions to rustling/banditry.

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Table 6. Names and Relief/Aid Activities of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

Name	Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dangote Foundation; Civilian and Security Joint Magamar Jibia; Jibia Inamafita Security Chambers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supporting Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) with foodstuff.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Batsari Local Government Development Forum; Campaign for Peace Initiatives; Sabuwa Youths Forum. • Red Cross; Save the Children; Medicus San Frontiers; UNICEF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of medication, shelter, clothes, and other health delivery services to the victims. • Providing relief materials to IDPs, including food, water, and medications.
--	--

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Table 7. Name and Transformative Activities of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

Name	Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sabon Gari Youths Association; Miyetti Allah Kyautar Hore; All Farmers Association of Nigeria; Human Rights Group; Society for Human Development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation meeting with the parties. Rebuilding relationships and holding peace meetings with community leaders.

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Table 8. Name and Self-Defence Activities of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

Name	Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vigilante group; Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF); Nigeria Hunters Group; Jibia Youth Security and Vigilante; Concern Society on Security Jibia; Operation Self-Defence. • Batsari Local Government Development Forum; Self-Control Community Patrol; Freedom Fighters Association. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrolling day and night to protect lives, properties and communities from attacks. Engaging rustlers/bandits to rescue kidnapped victims and rustled cattle. Searching for suspects and reporting to security personnel about the movement of rustlers/bandits. Assisting the security personnel in confronting rustlers/bandits and guarding people to work in their farms. • Provision of weapons to vigilante groups and paying them allowances. Providing information to the security personnel and encouraging communities to defend themselves.

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Some CSOs' members interviewed have further explained their activities in curbing the insecurity challenges. For instance, one of them stated:

“We sat down with the community’s elders, traditional rulers, and religious leaders to educate them about the consequences of insecurity problems. We assisted the victims with food, water and shelter. We also sensitized people



about the negative impact of insecurity, including the rustlers/bandits in their hideouts” (IR4).

Another interviewee explained that:

“We have severally written to the authorities at local and state levels, calling their attention to take action regarding the insecurity problems. We provided foodstuff and sensitized victims to stabilize their mental and emotional attitude across the IDP camps. We tried to collect data on rustling/banditry incidents daily” (IR10).

A respondent reiterated that:

“We sheltered the insecurity victims across IDP camps here in Batsari LGA. We provided them with foodstuff in cartons, including rice, grain, sugar, salt, Maggi, etc” (IR2).

A key informant revealed that:

“We provide foodstuff, pay school fees, and other expenses for the children whose parents were kidnapped or killed, from primary to secondary school. We also buy foodstuff and other basic things to IDPs. We collect data about those affected. Last week, the incoming Governor, Dr Dikko Umar Radda, sent to us requesting information about any affected victim, whether by gun shot or kidnapping, whether the person is back or still a hostage” (IR8).

Another CSOs’ member interviewed described that:

“We connect the displaced persons to their relatives. We provide their pressing needs like food, shelter, water, and medical assistance. We also treated those that sustained various injuries, give surveillance reports and took part in the dialogue committee while negotiating with the rustlers/bandits” (IR7).

A respondent further disclosed that:

“Some people here believe that what rustlers/bandits are doing is right, because of ignorance. We aim to change their thinking and mindsets. To make them understand that their actions are inappropriate. If they are fighting for their rights, it is not the proper way to do it. We engaged in sensitization, community mobilization, and creating interrelationship between the community and the government or security agencies” (IR6).

An interviewee stated that:

“We search and give information about the rustlers/bandits’ activities through our people in the nooks and corners of the state. As the government seek peoples’ assistance daily about information. That is where we see the importance and need to be engaged” (IR1).



One of the respondents noted that:

“We organized prayer sessions and assisted vigilantes and security personnel with some items for their operations, including weapons (around forty-something guns), touch-lights, jackets, foodstuff and fuelling their vehicles. We provide instructors so that the security personnel can penetrate the inaccessible areas. We engage the governments for things beyond our capacity. Last week, we struggled to ensure that the Army commandant is changed because he refused to command for the shot of a bandit terrorizing our communities called Cinnaka here in Madogara ward after he saw him. Thank God he has been changed. There was a time we accommodated 1017 IDPs. We cooked food and used two tanks to supply water for them. We made health workers available due to the congestion. After restoring peace, we transported them back to their villages” (IR3).

Another respondent said that:

“We patrol day and night through the various routes use by the rustlers/bandits to neutralize and deter them from attacking communities. We cannot hold our hands while other people come to steal our resources and cheat our families. That is why we saw the need to protect and uphold the integrity of our families from the ungodly activities of criminals” (IR12).

Gwaza (2022) found similar findings on the CSOs’ activities in curbing insecurity challenges, involving advocacy, enlightenment, gathering information, sensitization, awareness campaigns over the effect of insecurity, assisting victims and encouraging collective effort to address it.

1.4.3 The CSOs’ Strategies/Tactics in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

The activities engaged determine the strategies/tactics CSOs adopted in curbing the challenges of insecurity across communities. Therefore, 4 strategies/tactics were identified, which include job creation, community participation and mobilization, the use of religious leaders, and the stakeholders’ advice. The table below presented the strategies used:

Table 9. CSOs’ Strategies in Curbing Insecurity Challenges in Katsina State

Strategies/Tactics	Respondents’ views
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job creation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “We are creating jobs for youths through entrepreneurship. This is to prevent them from joining the rustling/banditry activities” (IR4).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Participation and Mobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “We employed community participation, sensitization, and mobilization to change the peoples’ thinking and mindsets for sustainable peace in the community” (IR6).



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of Religious Leaders • Stakeholders' Advice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “They engaged us to ensure that assistance has reached the victims of rustling/banditry” (IR2). “Our religious leaders are teaching us conflict resolution strategies from the Islamic perspectives that can strengthen peace in the society” (IR11). • “We seek advice from our community elders, religious leaders, and traditional leaders from district to ward heads. They counsel our activities” (IR12). “We always inquire from the security personnel to avoid lawlessness. They give us advice and directives on many securities-related issues” (IR11).
--	---

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

1.4.4 Source of Funds

The CSOs have different funding sources, which can be grouped into internal, community contributions, and external sources.

1.4.4.1 Internal Source

The CSOs generate funds within themselves to deliver their activities. Some of the respondents explained that “our funding comes from internal contributions among ourselves. Whatever one has, whether money or foodstuff, anything raised, will be shared to the victims’ houses” (IR5). “The source of finance is our pockets, but it is not enough” (IR10). “If anything happens to one of us, we contribute among ourselves to assist him. Whatever you have, no matter how little it is, but honestly, it is not enough” (IR12). “In our community here, there is no individual or group that assist or fund our activities. We do it by ourselves” (IR4). Another respondent stressed in the same manner that:

“No one is funding our activities. It is voluntary work. Again, the moment someone or a group of individuals takes your responsibility to source information, selfish interest may come in. You must do the way they want it” (IR1).

1.4.4.2 Community Contribution

The contribution under this category is community-based—CSOs source most of their funds from community members. For instance, a respondent said “the people of Damari community are assisting us with the little they can afford” (IR12). Another interviewee stated that:



“The district head (Sarkin Ruma) has specified a certain amount of money (fifty naira) that every indigene of Batsari must contribute weekly, including women inside the houses. At a time, this organization had over ten million naira in the account that we spent on the issue of insecurity” (IR3).

A key informant disclosed that:

“Every house contributes money monthly, depending on the nature of their living standard. If someone has stable income and can provide one thousand naira, then we collect. If it is a hundred naira, we also collect. We met all the needs of our activities through this kind of contribution. Sometimes, the contributions exceed our monthly needs. The community people are doing their best” (IR11).

1.4.4.3 External Source

Other CSOs source their funds externally. A respondent revealed that “we source funds from wealthy individuals outside but who are indigene of Faskari LGA. These people have tried to sympathized with the victims, though it is not enough” (IR10). Another respondent said:

“Honestly, the government assists us. There was a time, I took a letter to the Ministry of Youth and Support. Sometimes, they give you funds monthly or yearly. Also, the chairman of Dandume LGA assisted us on several occasions” (IR8).

A key informant noted that “our activities are sponsored by the local, state, and federal governments. The funding is enough to cater for the immediate needs of the IDPs” (IR7). Besides, an interviewee explained that:

“Our main sponsors are the Institute of Human Biology Nigeria (IHBN) and Save the Children. But, sometimes, the funding may not be enough. We do not have philanthropists in our community. It is not common here” (IR6).

In a nutshell, it is important to observed that from the activities and strategies to fund source, the CSOs have demonstrated the relevance of working together with all the stakeholders in addressing the insecurity challenges. They have engaged at different levels the traditional rulers, religious leaders, local/state government officials, rustlers/bandits, victims, elders, youths, security personnel and the communities as a whole.

1.4.5 The Impact of CSOs’ Activities in Curbing Insecurity Challenges

According to the respondents (67%) and (85%) in Batsari and Dan-Dume local government areas (LGAs), the activities of CSOs have transformed several aspects of insecurity challenges. Many youths were discouraged from engaging into the rustling/banditry activities. The



reconciliation efforts and synergy created between the communities and security personnel have significantly contributed to reducing the incidences. They have also promoted cooperation among many stakeholders and the general public and assisted in keeping some of the affected communities together.

Respondents (25%) and (66%) in Jibia and Faskari LGAs observed that the CSOs' activities have educated the villagers on how to escape during attacks and alert the security personnel for emergencies. This makes them active in some distress calls. People also understood better the consequences of engaging in rustling/banditry activities on the economic fortunes of their communities. In Kankara LGA, respondents (55%) argued that the CSOs' activities have made locals to mastered the art of using the media and peaceful demonstrations to express their displeasures and attract immediate assistance. This has made the government attentive and intensified efforts to addressing the insecurity problems.

In Safana LGA, respondents (12%) noted that the activities of CSOs have reduced the tensions and anxieties of victims and the communities. One of the interviewees observed that "the foodstuff shared to victims, if the family is not large, can be utilized for at least two weeks" (IR2). Respondents (72%) in Sabuwa LGA revealed that the communities now had better knowledge of their roles in fostering tolerance and peace among themselves. The preaching for peace by religious societies compelled some rustlers/bandits to repent and assist with information about the movements of non-repentant ones. The vigilante groups and Joint Task Force (JTF) have prevented communities from the rampant invasion and many perpetrators were arrested and handover to the police.

Furthermore, 38%, 25%, 12%, and 66% of the respondents in Dan-Musa, Jibia, Safana, and Faskari LGAs, respectively, observed that the community security defence measures had made the rustlers/bandits afraid of losing their lives, which reduced the intensity of their activities and excessive killings across communities. It has reduced the size of the rustlers/bandits as the vigilante members killed many of them. This has caused many youths to withdraw their ambitions of joining rustling/banditry. In other words, the activities of informants, frequent attacks, murder, kidnapping, and violation of human rights have drastically reduced, and many IDPs have returned to their communities. One of the key informants said:

"We hope to peacefully cultivate our farmlands this year that have not done



for the past eight years. We are seeing our farmlands, but cannot be accessed. Today, we buy grain at 750 naira, while maize is at 850 naira per measure. Throughout my life, I was born in 1969, and I am 53 years old this year, but I have never seen this rising cost of foodstuff” (IR3).

Respondents (55%) and (72%) in Kankara and Sabuwa LGAs argued that the jungle justice approach adopted by vigilante groups had instilled fear in the hearts of rustlers/bandits to the extent that they do not attack villages with a high concentration of vigilantes. People were encouraged to sacrifice efforts to monitor their communities for self-defence. In addition, the security personnel were better informed because the vigilantes assisted and guided them to the affected locations. Respondents (38%) in Dan-Musa LGA stated that these efforts had made people sleep comfortably, unlike before.

1.4.6 The Challenges of CSOs in Curbing Insecurity Problems

Respondents (52%) in Katsina state observed that inadequate funding, threats, and fear of being kidnapped or assassinated have restricted many CSOs' members from their activities in some affected villages. Some of the respondents stated that “no one is supporting us financially to extend our activities beyond the existing spheres” (IR4). “The more financial support we have, the more we extend the charity to many houses” (IR5). “We do not have enough equipment to confront the rustlers/bandits, and there is no money to buy” (IR12). Another interviewee narrated that:

“I have a message on my phone, which said, if we catch you, ‘Bala’ we will not collect money from you. You are to be killed. The reason I did not tell the authorities is that if they are arrested, they may likely be released. Then, my relatives can be targeted, if they cannot reach me. There was a time I spent 17 days inside the forest. Another time I escaped and lay down on the roof while exchanging fire. I was injured here on my leg” (IR1).

A respondent disclosed that:

“The issue of collecting data about rustling/banditry incidents has not lasted long. We faced threats through messages, warning us to stop before taking action against us. Indeed, many people would not be happy about it. There was a signal that even the government did not want activities of such nature” (IR10).

Furthermore, respondents in Faskari, Batsari, and Sabuwa LGAs (see Figure 1), noted that the high rate of poverty and illiteracy have turned villagers to be ignorant of their fundamental



human rights. The fear of informants has made them uncooperative and suspicious of one another. It has restricted access to valuable information from them, making CSOs' activities difficult in the communities. This has affected the success of CSOs in eradicating the insecurity challenges in the state.

In Batsari LGA, respondents (67%) observed the challenges of transportation facilities. Some of the interviewees revealed that “the two Hilux and motorcycles of hunters need to be repaired. Tyres of the two Hilux of vigilante deserved to be changed” (IR3). “Sometimes, even if we are informed, we do not have a vehicle that can transport us immediately to the area. We have that problem” (IR9). Besides, the CSOs' members lacked training and professionalism in their peace efforts. This has affected the synergy between various CSOs in curbing the insecurity challenges. Respondents (12%) in Safana LGA noted that the inadequate personnel and overpopulation of victims across IDP camps had also been a challenge to the CSOs.

Respondent (52%) in Katsina state discovered that the lack of sophisticated weapons and the inability to take action independently rather than handing the cases over to the police or soldiers has been a challenge to the vigilante groups. The vigilantes were not well motivated, many among them were illiterate, driven by the poverty and unemployment, lacking training, skills, experiences and commitments. Their size was also insufficient to defend communities due to the life risk of confronting the rustlers/bandits as the prime targets. Moreover, the vigilantes have no legal authority or law backing them to kill the perpetrators, except in exceptional cases. Besides, there were many corrupt allegations, injustices, and insincerity against them, as some members conspired to leak sensitive information to the rustlers/bandits. These have made them difficult to operate and hampered their efforts in combating the insecurity challenges. A respondent confirmed that:

“Sometimes, we may have a problem somewhere or in neighbouring communities. If we rush there to block the expected route, the rustlers/bandits will come through, one of us will inform them of the plans and advise them to change another route” (IR11).

Other challenges expressed by the respondents include; “some people were accusing us of turning the organizations' activities into private businesses” (IR8). “The major problem we have is the forests that rustlers/bandits are hiding in” (IR12). “In confronting the perpetrators, some of us lost their lives, and some sustained different degrees of injuries” (IR11). “Some of the affected communities are difficult to enter” (IR7). Gwaza (2022) identified a similar array



of challenges faced by CSOs in Nigeria, including inadequate funding, lack of professionalism, legal authority, influence, suspicion, lack of solidarity, politicization of activities and lack of access to remote communities, among others.

1.5 Conclusion

This study has established the participation of forty-eight (48) CSOs in curbing the insecurity challenges. Their contributions have been classified within the context of Nesbit's typology of CSOs activities comprises advocacy, policy, relief and transformation activities. However, the study found another category of CSOs' activities called "self-defence approach". In addition, the study categorized their funding sources into internal, community contributions, and external sources. The CSOs adopted four (4) strategies in curbing the challenges of insecurity, namely; job creation, community participation and mobilization, the use of religious leaders, and the stakeholders' advice. Most importantly, the CSOs' activities have positively impacted and transformed many areas of the insecurity problems, despite the array of challenges faced. It is very germane to stress that the CSOs have tremendously contributed and improved peaceful conditions of the affected communities in Katsina state.

1.6 Recommendations

1. The international, national, state, and other donor agencies should direct support and assistance to strengthen the CSOs' capabilities towards addressing the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state.
2. The CSOs must improve the quality, skills and competence of their members through various training, seminars and workshops. This will equip them with the new emerging ideas on how to intervene and resolve any insecurity related issues.
3. The issue of self-defence approach championed by the vigilante groups need to be sanitized by the local stakeholders. The members of these associations/organizations must be thoroughly accredited by the communities to avoid recruiting the potential collaborators of the rustlers and bandits.
4. Other critical stakeholders (traditional rulers, religious leaders, security personnel, local and state governments) must fully cooperate and support the activities of CSOs in addressing the insecurity challenges. This will give them courage and enabling environment to maintain their activities for sustainable peace in Katsina state.



5. The local, state and federal governments must eradicate the widespread of illiteracy, poverty and unemployment in the rural areas. These are part of the core cause of cattle rustling and armed banditry that cannot be fully addressed by the CSOs alone.

Reference

- Adi, I., & Onyebuchi, J. U. (2020). Banditry in Nigeria'S Northwest: a Reflective Perspective. *Caleb Journal of Social and Management Science*, 5(2), 208–224.
- Attah, N. E., Sambo, U., Sule, B., Bello, M. A., & Yoserizal, M. S. (2021). COVID-19 and Increased Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria: Interrogating Armed Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria. *Siasat*, 6(1), 33–44.
- Bashir, A. M., Azlizan, T & Yusof, R. B. (2018). Cattle Rustling in Kaduna State, Nigeria: An Assessment of the existing Preventive Approaches. *International Journal of Management Research & Review*, 8(9), 20–29.
- Bello, K & Kabiru, M. A. (2021). The Socio-Economic Repercussions of Cattle Rustling in Gusau Local Government Zamfara State, Nigeria. *International Journal of Innovative Research in Education, Technology & Social Strategies*, 8(1), 142–167.
- Bunei, E., McElwee, G., Smith, R. (2016). From Bush to Butchery: Cattle Rustling as an Entrepreneurial Process in Kenya. *Society and Business Review*, 11(1), 46–61.
- Diamond, L. (1999), Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation, *Journal of Democracy*, 5(6).
- Egwu, S. (2016). The political economy of rural banditry in contemporary Nigeria. *Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development*, 219.
- Garba, D. (2021). Armed Banditry in North West Borderlands and the Need for Deeper Nigeria- Niger Republic Bilateral Security Relations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution and Social Issues*, 2(1), 35–49.
- Gwaza, P. A. (2022). The Role of Civil Society in Nigeria's Core Conflicts: Farmer-Herder Conflict. *In the Shadows of*, 185.
- International Crisis Group. (2020). *Violence in Nigeria's North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem*. May, 1–43. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem>. Accessed 2nd February, 2023.
- Krejcie, R. V, & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research activities. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 30(3), 607–610.
- Kumar, S.D. (2007), *Conflict and Peace in India's Northeast: The Role of Civil Society, Project on Internal Conflicts and State, Building Challenges in Asia*, Washington, D.C.
- Ladan, S. I., & Usman, B. M. (2020). Impacts of Banditry on Food Security in Katsina State, Nigeria. *Direct Research Journal of Agriculture and Food Science*, 8(12), 439–449.



- Ladan, S. I. (2015). Assessing Security Threats Posed by Ruma/kukar Jangarai Forest Reserve to Batsari Lga Katsina State, Nigeria. *International Journal of Sciences*, 1(6), 62–71.
- Ladan, S. I. (2019). Analysis of contemporary insecurity in Katsina State, Nigeria. *Direct Research Journal of Social Science and Educational Studies*, 6(7), 95–102.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Mohammed, K., & Alimba, C. (2016). Social impact of rural banditry. *Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria*, 168–189.
- Nesbit, B. (2003). The Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution in Africa: An Institutional Analysis. *Political Theory and Policy Analysis*.
- National Bureau of Statistics (2018). *Annual Abstract of Statistics*. Federal Republic of Nigeria
- OECD (2009), *Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, Finding, Recommendations and Good Practice*, Publication Series: Better Aid Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Okoli, A. C., & Abubakar, M. (2021). ‘Crimelordism’: Understanding a New Phenomenon in Armed Banditry in Nigeria. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 56(7), 1724–1737.
- Olaniyan, A., & Yahaya, A. (2016). Cows, bandits, and violent conflicts: Understanding cattle rustling in Northern Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 51(3), 93–105.
- Paffenholz, T. (2014). International peacebuilding goes local: analysing Lederach’s conflict transformation theory and its ambivalent encounter with 20 years of practice. *Peacebuilding*, 2(1), 11–27.
- Rosenje, M. O., & Adeniyi, O. P. (2021). The Impact of Banditry on Nigeria’s Security in the Fourth Republic: an Evaluation of Nigeria’s Northwest. *Zamfara Journal of Politics and Development*, 2(1), 1–26.
- Rupesingle, K. & Anderlini, N. (1998). *Civil War, Civil Peace: An Introduction of Conflict Resolution*. London, Pluto Press.
- Sanusi, A. H. (n.d.). Corruption and the Challenges of Combating Kidnapping and Banditry in Nigeria’s Northwest Sub-Region. *Compromised*, 125.
- Udosen, N. M., & Uwak, U. (2021). Armed Banditry and Border Monitoring: Challenges for Nigeria’s Security, Peace and Sustainable Development. *European Journal of Political Science Studies*, 5(1), 45–72.
- Usman, S. I., & Ahmed, I. J. (2021). Efforts of Insecurity on Agricultural Activities in Katsina State, Nigeria. *ABU Journal of Public Administration*, 9(1), 33–55.
- Vernon, H. K & Nyamongo, G. (2020). Influence of Cattle Rustling on School Staffing Levels in Laikipia West Sub-County in Laikipia County, Kenya. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)*, IV(II), 2454–6186.
- Yahaya, J. U., & Bello, M. M. (2020). Kidnapping and Hostage taking : an emerging Issues of Insecurity in Kastina State. *Journal of Advances in Social Sciences and Hummanities*, 6(3), 1154–1162.