



The Impact of Refugee's Camp Displacement on the Nigeria-Niger Border Security, 2020- 2025

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of Refugee's camp displacement on the Nigeria-Niger border security, the Refugee of Nigerian origin displacement from camps and non-camp settings (Host communities) in the republic of Niger is a complex issue, with numerous impacts on the Nigeria-Niger border-security. The displacement is a catalyst and threat to border security, often stem from social and economic disruption or lack of basic necessities on camps leading to competition between refugee and the hosting communities, these challenges make refugees vulnerable to crime and other vices. Therefore, this paper assessed the factors responsible of refugees of Nigerian origin displacement in the republic of Niger camps, which posed a challenge to border security and management. The paper used systemic state-security model as a framework of analysis, the theory holds a holistic framework treats security as an integrated system, extending beyond technical controls to include people, processes and organizational strategy. The paper used field survey research method, employing both primary and secondary source of data, using questionnaire and interview as the instruments of data collection. It is established that, the weak trans-border security cooperation between Nigeria and Niger has led to influx of Nigerian refugees with huge pressure on the already insufficient resources and capacity of host Nigerien families. The Porosity of the border, convergence of economic opportunities along border line, Maltreatment/harassment of refugee by security personals, availability of the criminal activities like smuggling and the cultural, social and religious similarities are the major factors responsible of the refugee's displacement on camps and this posed a threat to border security. There should be serious commitment on border security, mutual assistance and bi-lateral relations between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger on effective collaborations and policy harmonization.

Key words: Refugee, IDPs, Nigeria-Niger, trans-border security, and security cooperation



1.0 INTRODUCTION:

The primary defining characteristic of international relations has been the diplomatic relations among nations. Traditional writings equate diplomacy, cooperation and conflict among nations with power, sovereignty, decision-making, crisis management, war and peace as the basis. Despite their size and degree of development, countries necessarily interact with one another, giving credence to the dictum that in world politics, no state is an island (Onouha, 2016). For Nigeria and Niger Republic, the activities of Boko Haram terrorists and armed bandits have compromised their security and put a strain on their finances by requiring higher security budgets, care of conflict victims, heightened transnational crimes and illegal migration, these issues posed a threat to their border security (UNHRC, 2017). The Nigeria-Niger border constitutes one of the vulnerable borders in West Africa regards of illegal migration, smuggling and insecurity. This is not unconnected with the cultural, economic, social, political, religious, and historical similarities among the two countries, more especially the border communities. Prior to colonialism, these people are homogeneous, the colonialist separate and created artificial borders among them, to form the modern states we have today in the sub-Sahara Africa, with these similarities therefore, it is assumed that the insecurity of one may have its own impact on the other. Years after, insecurity has created insurgents in Nigeria called (Boko-Haram) these insurgents resides and are originated from the Nigeria-Niger border states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. As such, the displaced persons seek solace in the republic of Niger as refugees. These challenge created burden on the hosting state and threat to its security. It also affected the management of the two borders.

Scholars have argued that the management of the Nigeria and Niger republic border is characterized by porosity, difficult terrain, in adequate manpower, inadequate surveillances facilities and hotspots for various form of trans-border crime, including Boko-Haram and armed banditry. To tackle these challenges, Nigeria and Niger republic entered into many bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties including the formation of NNJCC, MNJTF and many mutual assistance. Despite these efforts (assistance and agreements) the trans-border management around this border has contributed immensely to the incessant rise of refugees of Nigerian origin in the republic of Niger, added to the persistence of Boko-Haram and armed banditry along the border line. However, these growing threats of insecurity and poor border



managements are aided by the shared common history, culture, tradition, religion, and ethnic affiliations. In this respect, both criminals and non-criminals may have easy access to cross border especially, the border communities. According to United Nations office of the high commissioner on refugees (UNHCR) armed criminal gangs operate in both side of the border mainly targeting farmers and breeders, conducting kidnapping for ransom. It further stated that in the Diffa region of the republic of Niger as off 2022 there are 235,211 forcibly displaced persons including 129,835 refugees 67,817 IDPs 35,445 returnees and 2,114 asylum seekers. The impact of Refugee's camp displacement on the Nigeria-Niger border security cannot be overemphasized, the Refugee of Nigerian origin displacement from camps and non-camp settings (Host communities) in the republic of Niger is a complex issue, with numerous impacts on the Nigeria-Niger border-security. The displacement is a catalyst and threat to border security, often stem from social and economic disruption or lack of basic necessities on camps leading to competition between refugee and the hosting communities, these challenges make refugees vulnerable to crime and other vices. Therefore, to assess the factors responsible of refugees of Nigerian origin displacement in the republic of Niger camps, which posed a challenge to border security and management, this study used systemic state-security model as a framework of analysis, the theory holds a holistic framework treats security as an integrated system, extending beyond technical controls to include people, processes and organizational strategy. The paper reaffirmed that the weak trans-border management, is responsible of the rise of the refugees of the Nigerian origin in Niger. Despite all efforts on trans-border management, yet there are other factors responsible for the escalation of camp displacement of the refugees and are threats to security of both countries. Therefore, this paper explored the extent of trans-border security cooperation between Nigeria and Niger in the management of the rise of refugees and illegal migrants of the Nigerian origin. As such the following research question is formulated:

Does weak trans-border security cooperation between Nigeria and Niger contribute to the incessant rise in refugees of Nigerian origin?

1.1 Trans-border Security Management of refugee and the Rise in Displaced Persons in Refugee of the Nigerian origin

The results of activities of Boko-Haram extremist in the north east and armed bandits in the north west have resulted in the displacement of more than 300,000 thousand Nigerians who



fled for safety into Chad, Cameroon, and the Niger Republic (UNHCR, 2021). These refugees experience serious humanitarian crises (dang and Christian, 2020). In the Republic of Cameroon there was a forced repatriation of Nigerian refugees back to Nigeria (UNHCR, 2020), this forced repatriation of Nigerian refugees in Cameroon engineered our interest to interrogate the implementation of the international refugees laws in the Republic of Niger, this is because Republic of Niger host majority of the Nigerian refugees, according to UNHCR more than 280,000 thousands Nigerian Boko Haram refugees are in Diffa region of the Republic of Niger.

In 2022, there is an increase in the number of Nigerian refugees in the Republic of Niger as the result of the armed banditry crises going on in the North Western sub-region of northern Nigeria. According to UNHCR, more than 80,000 thousand Nigerians fled to the Republic of Niger to seek refuge as a result of the recent armed banditry crises going on in northwest Nigeria (UNHCR, 2022). According to Rufai (2021), the contemporary armed banditry started in 2013 as a farmer-herder conflict in Zamfara State, which brought about the destruction of lives of properties worth millions of naira, displaced hundreds of thousands of people and affected almost all the north-western states of the Federal Republic of Niger and some north central states, displaced thousand refugees to the Niger Republic. Banditry in Zamfara State and some north-western states have affected all the spheres of life of the people in the affected areas. It has destroyed thousands of lives, displaced thousands of people, and destroyed lives-stocks and properties worth millions of naira. Moreover, it was also estimated that there are at least ten (10) thousand armed bandits and cattle rustlers operating out of the eight major camps in Zamfara State (Sulaiman, 2019). He also argued that in Anka LGA alone, over sixteen thousand people have been internally and externally displaced (Suleiman, 2019).

From the foregoing, it could be deduced that armed banditry has affected the lives and properties of thousands of Nigerians and forced thousands to flee to the Republic of Niger to seek refuge. Most of the armed banditry refugees are domiciled in the regions of Maradi and Zinder of the Republic of Niger (UNHCR, 2022), they are scattered in the rural communities and some in camp settlements. As a result, therefore, it becomes imperative to interrogate the implementation of the international refugee laws on the Nigerian refugees and examined the conditions and the challenges of the Nigerian refugees in the Republic of Niger and beyond.



1.2 Niger-Nigeria border (in)security and the rise of refugees

The areas where these conflicts have been based have helped in the transmission of the spill-over effect to the Republic of Niger. This is because all the conflict areas shared a border with the Republic of Niger; the north-western states of Nigeria shared a border with southern Niger, where bandits are based, while north-eastern Nigeria shared a border with eastern Niger. The disastrous activities of these two deadly terrorist groups have seriously affected the peaceful co-existence of these two countries, with a lot of challenges to the Republic of Niger.

The activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria metamorphose into a threat to Niger Republic in 2014 and beyond when the Nigerian and combine military forces pushed a certain number of Boko Haram to the Niger Republic, particularly the Diffa region (UN, 2017). The Republic of Niger sends troops to the region to surpass the threat and send some portion of the troops to Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

From the other end, the south-west of the Republic of Niger is also affected severely by the activities of armed bandits from the states of Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Kebbi, and Niger states all from north-west Nigeria, mainly by pushing people to the Republic of Niger as refugees and some bandits also run to hide in the Republic of Niger when pushed by the Nigerian security forces or the Republic of Niger securities. However, the activities of armed banditry got international recognition when their activities affected almost all the north-western states of Nigeria that shared borders with the Republic of Niger. The armed bandits displaced thousands of people and forced others to seek refuge in the Republic of Niger. Recently in 2022, United Nations observed a flow of additional 80,000 Nigerian refugees in the region of Maradi (UN, 2022). Some of the bandits used proximity and accessibility to export their stolen livestock through the Republic of Niger (Rufa'i, 2022).

Similarly, Mathias and Uwak (2021) argued that the greatest challenge facing Nigeria today is international terrorism which is aided by religious extremism, the porosity of borderline, cross-border security challenges, and crime. They believed that the existence of porous borders, illegal cross-border activities, and frontier activities in Nigeria has aided crimes and security challenges across Nigerian borders with the Republic of Niger and beyond for a long without any specific solutions. In their efforts to examine the security challenges and the socio-economic effects of insurgency and armed banditry in Nigeria, they further argued that Nigeria has been severely affected by internal socio-economic and security threats. These threats have social, economic, political, and environmental dimensions. Each of these dimensions has



greatly affected the nation's stability, and can be traced to the ethnic militia armies, ethnic and religious conflicts, poverty, terrorism, armed robbery, corruption, economic sabotage, and environmental degradation (Mathias and Uwak 2021). Nigeria and Niger Republic agreed to strengthen security surveillance along their common borders to ward off rampaging terrorists within the Lake Chad region (Ailemen, 2022). These show how illegal cross-border activities and the borderless Nigeria-Niger borders aided insecurity and fuelled improper migrations.

1.3 Theoretical framework:

The paper used systemic state-security model as a framework of analysis, the theory holds a holistic framework, treats security as an integrated system, extending beyond technical controls to include people, processes and organizational strategy. The theory is designed to integrate various data sources, law enforcement, into a centralized system for enhanced decision making and proactive threat prevention.

Basically, the theory is centered on collaboration and cooperation among various governmental departments by identifying and neutralizing threats. Therefore, the factors which led to the rise of refugees' displacement from camps and hosting communities are threat to state and border security.

1.4 Methodology:

This study made use of the mixed methods which entailed both the survey and documentary methods of data collection. For the survey, the study adopted key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGDs); and used questionnaire where necessary, while the secondary data were gotten from documentary sources.

Population and Sample Size

This study used the population of Nigerian refugees in Niger Republic as recorded by the United Nations caused by armed bandits and Boko Haram with an estimated number of 358,774 (UN Report, 2022). There are 287,145 Nigerian refugees in Niger Republic of which 80,000 or more are refugees specifically from banditry attacks.

The study used the Diffa region where Boko Haram victims are located and Maradi and Tahoua regions where banditry victims and few Boko Haram victims are located and Camp as a clusters. In these regions, there are refugee camps and hosting villages/communities, in this



regard, the study selected the following states/regions, camps, and villages purposively. Because it was reported that most Nigerian refugees are in the selected regions and the established camp by the United Nations are: one in Furon/Diffa region; one in the Maradi region; one in Tahoua, and two in Niamey. Other refugee camps in the Republic of Niger are not relevant to our study like a refugee camp for displaced persons from Mali. From there, we selected the hosting communities randomly using multi-stage sampling techniques in selecting the hosting communities or villages because more than 300 communities are hosting Nigerian refugees for both Boko Haram victims and armed banditry victims. As such, we selected three communities or villages in each region of the Niger Republic by lottery.

Sampling and Sampling Techniques

The study used both probability and non-probability sampling techniques due to the nature of the study; and this included: Multi-stage sampling techniques, Purposive sampling techniques and Snowballs sampling techniques. Multi-stage cluster sampling techniques was used to divide the areas where refugees are located into Boko Haram refugees and armed banditry refugees in the Republic of Niger as the cluster of convenience, as it corroborated the country's geopolitical arrangements. This is because bandits' refugees are in the North-West region of the country while the Boko Haram refugees are in the South-East region of the country. From there, three villages or towns among the most affected were selected in the Maradi, Zinder regions; and three villages were selected in the Diffa region of the country among the most affected and accessible, using random sampling.

Data Presentation and analysis

Table 1: Perceived factors responsible of refugees of Nigerian origin displacement in the republic of Niger camps, which posed a challenge to border security and management

SN	Factor	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Undecided	Total
1	Lack of enough welfare	278 (64%)	49 (11%)	78 (17%)	43 (10%)	05 (1%)	453 (100%)
2	Poverty	211 (47%)	88 (19%)	81 (18%)	48 (11%)	25 (6%)	453



3	Corruption of the securities	197 (44%)	101 (22%)	92 (20%)	37 (8%)	26 (6%)	453
4	Financial gain	171 (38%)	78 (17%)	11 (3%)	137 (30%)	56 (12%)	453
5	Porosity of the border	254 (56%)	54 (12%)	32 (7%)	70 (16%)	43 (10%)	453
6	Convergence of economic opportunities along border line	303 (67%)	94 (21%)	25 (6%)	21 (5%)	10 (2%)	453
7	Rise in terrorism and insurgency	128 (28%)	121 (26%)	125 (28%)	43 (10%)	36 (8%)	453
8	Maltreatment/harassment by security personals	188 (42%)	109 (24%)	65 (14%)	31 (7%)	60 (13%)	453
9	Criminal activities like smuggling	54 (12%)	62 (14%)	217 (48%)	51 (11%)	69 (15%)	453
10	Lack of economic opportunities in camps	301 (66%)	81 (18%)	18 (4%)	41 (9%)	12 (3%)	453
11	Cultural, social and religious similarities	349 (77%)	41 (9%)	30 (7%)	15 (3%)	18 (4%)	453
12	Hunger	209 (46%)	75 (17%)	134 (30%)	16 (4%)	19 (4%)	453
14	Lack of Basic amenities on Camps	241 (53%)	59 (13%)	101 (22%)	43 (10%)	09 (2%)	453
15	Discrimination	111 (25%)	34 (8%)	229 (51%)	60 (13%)	21 (5%)	453
16	ECOWAS Protocol on Free	301 (66%)	52 (12%)	63 (14%)	28 (6%)	09 (2%)	453



	Movement						
TOTAL							100.0

Source: Field Work, 2023

The above table shows the perceived factors responsible for poor trans-border management which contributed to the rise in the displaced persons in refugee camps. The table shows that Lack of enough welfare is one of the major factors responsible of the rise in displace persons in refugee camps, two hundred and seventy eight (278) respondents, representing 64% of the total respondents strongly agree that lack of enough welfare have contributed immensely to the rise in displacement in refugee camps in Niger, while forty nine (49) respondents representing 11% of the total respondents agree with the above submission and seventy eight (78) respondents on the contrary representing 17% of the total respondents strongly disagree that lack of enough welfare was responsible to refugees displacements on camps, while forty three (43) of the respondents, representing 10% of the total respondents agree that lack of enough welfare was not responsible to the rise and finally five (05) respondents, representing 1% of the total respondents undecided on the question ask or have no idea. Therefore, this indicates that lack of enough welfare to refugees on camps settings are among the major factors responsible to the rise in displacement of persons in refugee camps and the factor is not unconnected with the poor management of the Nigeria Niger border which give the refugees the opportunities to explore other chances.

The table above also shows poverty and the poor trans-border management with the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps, the result shows that two hundred and eleven respondents (211) representing 47% of the total respondents strongly agree while eighty eight (88) of the respondents, representing 19% of the total respondents also agree with role of poverty as a factor, and eighty one (81) respondents representing 18% of the total respondents strongly disagree and forty eight (48) respondents representing 11% of the total respondents disagree as well while twenty five (25) respondents, representing 6% of the total respondents undecided. Therefore, this finding indicates that poverty is one of the factors responsible of the nexus between poor trans-border management and the rise of displacement in the refugee camps in Niger Republic.

The table above also explore the corruption of the securities of the Republic of Niger as a factor, one hundred and ninety seven respondents (197) representing 44% of the total respondents strongly agree that corruption of the securities is responsible of poor trans-border



management and the rise in the displacements in the refugee camps, while one hundred and one (101) respondents representing 22% of the total respondents also agree that corruption of the securities is a factor, while ninety two (92) respondents, representing 20% of the total respondents strongly disagree of corruption as a factor while thirty seven (37) respondents representing 8% of the total respondents disagree and twenty six (26) respondents, representing 6% of the total respondents undecided. Therefore, this indicates that corruption of securities is a factor responsible of poor trans-border management and the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps.

The table also shows that one hundred and seventy one (171) respondents, representing 38% of the total respondents strongly agree Financial gain as a factor which contributed to the link between poor trans-border management and the rise in displacement in the refugee camps, while, seventy eight (78) respondents, representing 17% of the total respondents agree that financial gain contributed, while eleven (11) respondents, representing 3% of the total respondents strongly disagree while one hundred and thirty seven (137) respondents, representing 30% of the total respondents disagree that financial gain is never a factor in the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps and finally thirty six (36) respondents, representing 12% of the total respondents undecided with no opinion. Therefore, this indicates that financial gain is a factor (for both refugees and other actors) which contributed to poor border management and has a connection to the rise of displacement of refugees in camps.

The table above also shows that the porosity of the Nigeria-Niger border is a factor which contributed to poor border management and facilitated the rise in the displacements of refugees in camps. Two hundred and fifty four (254) respondents, representing 56% of the total respondents strongly agree that is a factor and have facilitated many evil and challenges, while fifty four (54) of the respondents, representing 12% of the total respondents agree that is a factor to the challenge, while thirty two (32) of the respondents, representing 7% of the total populations strongly disagree that porosity of the Nigeria-Niger border was never a factor, while seventy (70) respondents, representing 16% of the total respondents disagree, while forty three (43) of the respondents, representing 10% of the total respondents undecided. Therefore, this indicates that the porosity of the Nigeria-Niger border is a factor which contributed to the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps.

The table above also shows convergence of economic opportunities along the border line as a factor which contributed to rise of displacements of refugees in camps, this is evident looking



at the respondents who strongly agree that convergence of economic opportunities along the border line is a factor, whereby three hundred and three (303) respondents, representing 67% of the total respondents strongly agree, while ninety four (94) of the respondents, representing 21% of the total respondents agree as well, while twenty five (25) respondents, representing 6% of the total respondents strongly disagree and twenty one (21) respondents, representing 5% of the total respondents disagree and finally ten (10) respondents, representing 2% of the total respondents undecided.

The table above also shows rise in terrorism and insurgency was not significance in the rise in the displacement of refugee in camps. The table shows that one hundred and twenty eight (128) respondents, representing 28% of the total respondents strongly agree on the rise in terrorism and insurgency as a factor, while one hundred and twenty one (121) respondents representing 26% of the total respondents agree with the rise in terrorism and insurgency as a factor, while one hundred and twenty five (125) respondents, representing 28% of the total respondents strongly disagree that rise in terrorism and insurgency is never a factor in the rise of displacements in the refugee camps, while forty three (43) respondents, representing 10% of the total respondents disagree while thirty six (36) respondents, representing 8% of the total respondents undecided.

The table above shows how poor trans-border management help the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps in the Republic of Niger. The table shows that one hundred and eighty eight (188) respondents, representing 42% of the total respondents strongly agree that Maltreatment/harassment by security personals are responsible to the rise of displacements of refugees in camps, and is not un-connected to poor border management. While one hundred and nine (109) respondents, representing 24% of the total respondents agree that is a facto, while sixty five (65) respondents, representing 14% of the total respondents strongly disagree and thirty one (31) respondents representing 7% of the total respondents disagree and finally sixty (60) respondents, representing 13% of the total respondents undecided/not sure.

The above table also shows the nexus between criminal activities such as smuggling and the rise of the displacements of refugees in camps. The table shows only fifty four (54) respondents, representing 12% of the total respondents strongly agree that criminal activities like smuggling is a factor, while sixty two (62) respondents, representing 14% of the total respondents agree, while two hundred and seventeen (217) respondents, representing 48% of the total respondents strongly disagree and fifty one (51) respondents, representing 11% of the



total respondents disagree and finally sixty nine (69) respondents, representing 15% of the total respondents undecided/not sure. Therefore, this indicates that criminal activities such as smuggling are never a factor among the factors responsible for the rise of displacement of refugees in camps.

The above table also shows how lack of economic opportunities on camps contributed to the rise of refugee displacement in camps. The table shows three hundred and one (301) respondents, representing 66% of the total respondents strongly agree that lack of economic activities on the refugee camps are responsible to refugee displacements in camps, while eighty one (81) respondents, representing 18% of the total respondents agree with lack of economic opportunities as a factor, while eighteen (18) respondents, representing 4% of the total respondents strongly disagree, while forty one (41) respondents, representing 9% of the total respondents disagree and finally twelve (12) respondents representing 3% of the total respondents undecided/not sure. Therefore, this indicates that lack of economic opportunities is a factor responsible to the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps.

The above table also shows the link between poor border management and the rise in the displacement in the refugee camps and how cultural, social and religious similarities played role to the challenge. The table shows three hundred and forty nine (349) respondents, representing 77% of the total respondents strongly agree that cultural, social and religious similarities had help in the rise of displacements in refugee camps, while forty one (41) of the respondents, representing 9% of the total respondents agree, while thirty (30) respondents representing 7% of the total respondents strongly disagree and fifteen (15) of the respondents, representing 3% of the total respondents agree and finally eighteen (18) respondents, representing 4% of the total respondents undecided/not sure. This finding indicates that, social, cultural and religious similarities have help the rise of the displacements of refugees in camps and is a directly connected to poor border management.

The table above also shows the nexus between hunger and the rise in the displacement of refugees in camps. The table shows that two hundred and nine (209) respondents, representing 46% of the total respondents strongly agree that hunger is a factor while seventy five (75) respondents, representing 17% of the total respondents agree and one hundred and thirty four (134) respondents, representing 30% of the total respondents strongly disagree, while sixteen (16) respondents, representing 4% of the total respondents disagree and finally nineteen (19) respondents, representing 4% of the total respondents undecided/not sure. The above table also



shows the link between lack of basic amenities on camps and the rise of displacement in refugee camps. The table shows two hundred and forty one (241) respondents, representing 53% of the total respondents strongly agree that lack of basic amenities on camps help the rise of displacement in refugee camps, while fifty nine (59) of the respondents, representing 13% of the total respondents agreed, while one hundred and one (101) respondents, representing 22% of the total respondents strongly disagree and forty three (43) respondents, representing 10% of the total respondents disagree and finally nine (9) respondents representing 2% of the total; respondents undecided/not sure.

The table above also shows how discriminations on the basis rights, colour, religion, and race contributed to the rise in displacement of refugees in camps. The table shows that one hundred and eleven (111) respondents, representing 25% of the total respondents strongly agree that there was discriminations and this discriminations help in the rise of displacement of refugees in camps, and thirty four (34) respondents, representing 8% of the total respondents agreed, while two hundred and twenty nine (229) respondents, representing 51% of the total respondents strongly disagree that there was nothing like discriminations on whatever basis, while sixty respondents (60) representing 13% of the total respondents disagreed and finally twenty one (21) respondents, representing 5% of the total respondents undecided/not sure. Therefore this finding indicates that there is nothing like discriminations face by the Nigerian refugees in the Republic of Niger and it becomes evident when the majority of the respondents strongly disagreed with discriminations of any kind.

The above table also shows the nexus between the perceived factors responsible for poor trans-border management which contributed to the rise in the displaced persons in refugee camps and the ECOWAS free movement protocol. The table shows that three hundred and one (301) respondents, representing 66% of the total respondents strongly agree that ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Goods is a factor responsible of the rise in the displacement in refugee camps, while fifty two (52) respondents, representing 12% of the total respondents agree, while sixty three (63) respondents, representing 14% of the total respondents strongly disagree and twenty eight (28) respondent, representing 6% of the total respondents disagree and finally nine (9) respondents, representing 2% of the total respondents undecided/not sure. Therefore, this indicates that, the ECOWAS free movement protocol is a factor responsible to the rise in the displacement in the refugee camps.



1.6 Conclusion

This paper noted that the glaring porosity of the Nigeria-Niger border, cultural similarities, bribery and corruption, inadequate enough security personnel, lack of modern technology, among others, were the major setbacks to the control of illegal migrants along the Nigeria-Niger border, along with their severe consequences, and they however, breeds the persistence of terrorism, insurgency, armed banditry, armed robbery, theft, smuggling, among many other social and security vices in the border line, they also however facilitated the troop of the victims of arm conflicts to the Republic of Niger as refugees, fuelled some of their illegal acts which affected border security of both countries.

1.7 Recommendation

Therefore, there should be a compulsory registration of inter-marriage, births and deaths, internally displaced persons, the refugees, and business people who come from other communities or any part of Nigeria and Niger, among the border communities, for proper identification and records. Bribery and corruption should be handled with a severe punishment that may serve as deterrence to others. There should be serious commitment on border security bi-lateral relations between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger on effective collaborations and policy harmonization. The borders of both countries need more manpower and modern technologies for instant identification and proper documentation. These will help to improve trans-border security management by the governments of Nigeria and the Niger Republic.

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