

# THE IMPACT OF THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA (PERSPECTIVES FROM THE NORTH EAST INSURGENCY)

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## **Abstract**

*This paper assessed the impacts of the use of intelligence in conflict management in the North East insurgency. The right to protection by every citizen of any country is sacrosanct. This sacrosanctness derives from the social contract that establishes the state. At the core of social contract establishing the state is individuals giving up their right to self-protection in return for the state guaranteeing it. To carry out this primary responsibility, the government of every state uses various strategies including, but not limited to intelligence gathering. The main objective of this study is to highlight the importance of intelligence gathering, analysis and execution in conflict situations. Gathering intelligence on issues of national interests enables the government to identify potential conflicts before they occur, prevent from occurring and, when they occur, manage and resolve them. Thus, the use of intelligence in conflict resolution forms an integral element of conflict management. This research relied on secondary data. The theoretical framework of this research is the structural functionalist theory. So much scholarly work has been done about the ongoing North-East insurgency in Nigeria, however, very little has been said about how intelligence can significantly impact the management as well as the resolution of the conflict. The insurgency, over a decade on, has become a humanitarian disaster with thousands of lives lost, properties and means of livelihoods destroyed and millions of internally displaced people have become refugees in their own country. The thrust of this research is on how the government of Nigeria can effectively harness intelligence to manage the lingering insurgency in the North East. The study however found out that lack of political will and the politicization of national security by the government, have prompted intelligence 'failures' that have over the years hampered the course of managing and resolving this conflict. The study therefore recommended that engaging effective counter propaganda and a clear definition of duties and responsibilities of the agencies will help in intelligence gathering.*

**Keywords:** Conflict, Conflict Management, Intelligence, Insurgency.

## Introduction

Nigeria in the last decade has experienced an increase in violent conflicts and criminality. The violence and criminality which have come in the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking and militancy among others, have undermined the national security. Internally, security has been significantly undermined by violent activities of civilians taking up arms against the Nigerian State. This includes radicalized religious and regional youth groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), O’Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), the Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, ‘Kala-Kato’ and Ombatse among others (Onuoha, 2012). Boko Haram’s persistent murderous terrorist attacks have destroyed several lives and properties. The most affected region of this insurgency is the North Eastern region of Nigeria, an area that occupies slightly less than one-third of Nigeria’s total land area and had a projected population for 2019 of about 23,558,674 or 13.5% of the country’s population.

Insurgency is not a new form of violent expression of opposition. Peoples from time immemorial have always used insurgency as a means of making their voices heard or ultimately bringing about a desired political, social or economic change in the society. Insurgencies have been essential in nation building activities since the earliest time of history. Insurgency has probably been the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the creation of organized political communities, (O’Neill, 2005). Many postcolonial insurgencies have demanded the right to self-determination: that is, freedom from foreign intervention, especially from what is often viewed as puppet regimes or regimes set up and funded by colonial powers, for their own benefit. In counter-insurgency, clearly a necessary tactical response against Boko Haram in North East Nigeria, believed to have an appreciable hold on the local population, the heavy-handed use of military power is counterproductive. As Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson (2006: 15) noted, ‘A direct relationship exists between the appropriate use of force and successful counterinsurgency.’

Intelligence was early recognized as a vital tool of state craft of diplomacy or war or both. Writing 2500 years ago, the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu (flourished in 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C) stressed the importance of intelligence. Intelligence refers to discreet and secret information with the currency, relevance, abstraction, evaluation and understanding of such information for military or political value. Since the beginning of time, intelligence has traditionally fulfilled wide ranging and crucial functions in security, diplomacy and statecraft. However, the role of intelligence in conflict resolution has expanded and now forms a core element of conflict management policies and strategies

Conflict refers to a prolonged armed struggle - in cases of armed conflicts. Although worldwide, a universally acceptable definition of what conflict really is has in itself generated conflicts with different institutions on conflict and individuals giving varying definitions on what they perceive the term really is (Heinz, 2006). Conflicts are very

prominent trends in African states. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and third world states of the globe are ravaged by armed conflicts. Armed conflicts are defined as political conflicts in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state or one or more-armed factions seeking to gain control of all or parts of the state, and in which at least, 1000 people have been killed by fighting during the course of armed battle (CRED: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters). Managing conflicts has never been an easy job for every party involved. Conflict is often seen as a purely negative element in a change process – or at least one with a strong negative potential. Managing a conflict such as the Boko Haram insurgency deeply rooted in religious extremism is highly complicated and is a huge challenge. This could also be why it has been difficult for even the world super powers to bring an end to insurgencies with religious bent in the Global War against Terrorism. Therefore, this paper is set to study the impacts of the use of intelligence gathering in combating insurgencies and managing conflicts.

### **Problem Statement**

The North East Insurgency continues to linger, even after a decade. Since then, a humanitarian disaster never experienced in the country since the end of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) has been triggered. Thousands of lives have been lost, properties lie in ruins, sources of livelihood in the affected region destroyed, basic infrastructures have become inaccessible and families have been displaced. Even as the carnage continues, there seems to be no end in sight to the conflict. The Nigerian government has adopted various strategies in addressing this menace all to no avail. Military tactics and negotiations over the years have rather made the Boko Haram insurgents to regroup, change tactics and become bolder in their acts. The adoption of intelligence gathering as a potent weapon in confronting this national security challenge, however, needs to be primary to the government.

Intelligence gathering is dearly needed in this war on insurgency to give necessary direction to tactical and operational commanders. Intelligence about the enemy gives the government and its agencies an edge over the insurgent. Intelligence is needed on enemy movements, their capacity, their strengths and weaknesses alike. To this end, it is of utmost importance that all the primary Nigerian intelligence agencies, that is, the Department of State Services (DSS), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) needs to rise up to their responsibilities of intelligence gathering to help government manage the conflict until its resolution. Therefore, the first major problem that needs addressing is the lack of understanding of the importance of intelligence gathering and analysis in the management of any conflict situation.

So far, even with the presence of these agencies in the conflict, there have been massive intelligence failures, most notably the attacks on the 157 Task Force Battalion in Metele, the school children kidnappings in Chibok, then Dapchi and so on. These failures could be avoided if intelligence agencies do their jobs as statutorily required of them. The

intelligence architecture in Nigeria overtime has shown it is not up to the task of managing and resolving this conflict. The responsibilities of these intelligence agencies also need to be made clear so they do not waste their already insufficient manpower. For example, the DSS that has the statutory responsibility of carrying out internal surveillance and intelligence gathering is instead dissipating its lean manpower resources as VIP escorts for politicians rather than concentrating on their primary duties (Shehu, 2014). The aforementioned problem of intelligence failure has been the reason why the government seemed to have not made headway in the management of the insurgency. This paper makes attempt to address this problem by providing a road map to on how to effectively maximise the possibilities intelligence gathering and its usage in managing this insurgency and also preventing the occurrence of another conflict in the future.

### **Research Questions**

1. What is the importance of intelligence gathering and analysis in management of conflict situations?
2. What is the impact of intelligence administration in North East Nigeria?
3. What are the challenges facing Nigeria's intelligence architecture in the North East?
4. How can the intelligence gathering be effectively managed to bring an end to the conflict in the North East?

### **Empirical Literature**

Already, in the sphere of everyday life and language, the term conflict has no positive connotation. Usually, words like discord, dispute or fighting are associated with it. Therefore it is not surprising that the debate about conflict is significant in international relations. Verma (2018) addresses three different views of conflict – the Traditional view; which assumes that conflict is bad and always has a negative impact, therefore it must be avoided as it is closely associated with violence, destruction and irrationality. The Contemporary or Behavioural view argues that conflict is natural and inevitable in all organisations and it may have either a positive or negative effect, depending on how the conflict is handled. The approach advocates rationalizing its existence because of potential benefits. The Interactionist view assumes that conflict is necessary to increase performance. The approach encourages the maintenance of an appropriate level of conflict; based on the belief that a harmonious, peaceful, tranquil state might become apathetic and unable to respond to change and innovation (this view in a political setting will most likely breed conspiracy theories). He further classifies conflict into three broad categories including Goal-oriented conflicts (associated with results, priorities and objectives), Administrative conflicts (associated with authority and management structure) and Inter-personal conflicts (from egos and personalities of individuals).

On their part, Michael Brecher and Patrick James' (1988) "Patterns of Crisis Management" enunciated how to distinguish conflicts and the management of international crisis from 1945-1979, with specific emphasis on cases in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The authors noted

that crisis management has two distinct meanings in literature on world politics. First definition refers to the behaviour of participants involved in the conflicts and the mechanisms that states employ to cope with the stress of managing it. The second is concerned with the behaviour of intermediaries in the conflict, especially major powers and international organisations to prevent crisis escalation and/or hasten crisis abatement among states. The authors explain that conflict management is explored and deployed from the outset of crisis up to its termination. They identified the Arab-Israeli conflict as a 'protracted conflict'; because the stakes are high, it lingers in time and it has no distinguishable point of termination. This is similar in process/style to the insurgency that has engulfed the North East Nigeria. In managing this sort of conflict, the authors highlighted three perceptions that must be held by highest-level decision makers: **'Perception of a threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent expectation of a higher probability of involvement in military hostilities, and the awareness of finite time for response...'**

### **Boko Haram Insurgency and Nigeria's Security**

As Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya (2009) had asserted in his work 'Domestic terrorism and security threats in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria,' the respective tendencies of the Nigerian state on one hand and the recklessness, exploitative and environmentally unfriendly activities of the oil wealth has turned the whole Nigeria into a terrorist zone. As much as the work is specifically focused on the Niger-Delta region, similar variables apply to the deadly insurgency that has engulfed the North East Nigeria for over a decade now. The author believes that the solution to these acts of domestic terrorism however should not be repressive and military but policies promoting social justice and equity. The Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is rooted in religious sentiments like the ISIS in Syria and Al-shabab in the Horn of Africa, however, Gomes Joseph Flavian believes ethno-linguistic diversity drives conflicts more than religious diversity. In his work, "Religious Diversity, Intolerance and Civil Conflicts," he cites the example of a country like Afghanistan, which is the least religiously diverse country in the world with 99% of the population being Muslim. Yet, it is the 5<sup>th</sup> most intolerant country in the dataset used for his work. It is the same with Pakistan, which is the 3<sup>rd</sup> most intolerant country in the dataset. He is not surprised that those countries face more violent domestic conflict. Gomes believes that in the end, conflict is down to the ethno-linguistic diversity more than religious diversity. The author also attempted to establish a relationship between some religions and violent activities. This for him would affirm that it is not religious diversity that matters but the fact that some religions, by virtue of being more violent court conflicts.

In her book, 'Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency', Virginia Comolli (2015) traces the historical background of Islam in Nigeria to the Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad in 1804, the same doctrine upon which the jihad was waged, is the basis upon which the insurgent group Boko Haram claims to be fighting. She asserted that even though Boko Haram made international headlines in the late 2000s – early 2010s, it was hardly Nigeria's first islamist movement. While it has manifested almost unprecedented levels of brutality, religious

violence is nothing new to Northern Nigeria. To her, “the nature of the violence motivated, albeit not exclusively by religious beliefs provides an additional challenge for the Nigerian security forces tasked with defeating a violent movement.” The author further identified the genesis of modern radical groups in Nigeria; citing examples of Daawa movement led by pro-Iranian fundamentalist Aminu Abubakar, Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah Ja’amutu Tajidmul Islami / Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), led by now-incarcerated Ahmed Zakzaky – regarded as noisy supporters of al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, Yan Izala by Sheik Gumi Abubakar’s protégé named Isma’ila Idris in 1978 and Maitatsine, which was arguably the most widely cited religiously motivated insurgency in Nigeria before the emergence of Boko Haram. What followed was the splintering of the sects, their transformation from radical violent organisations to terrorist organisations, then to the reformation and modernization of these terrorists into trans-national terror organisation, for example Boko Haram and Ansaru.

Similarly, a research paper by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House (2014), titled ‘Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis,’ further sheds light on the genesis and the operational capacity of the dreaded Boko Haram sect which has ravaged the North-Eastern part of Nigeria for almost a decade now, and recently, the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The author observed that, “the inability of Nigeria’s armed forces to obstruct its onslaught, combined with a higher international profile, have lent it a confidence and ambition that appear to have prompted increasingly strategic behaviour, alongside its ongoing indiscriminate and widespread attacks against civilian and state targets.” In the author’s believe, the Boko Haram movement grew out of the socio-economic flux that came with a process of domestic transition coupled with the consequence of decades of mismanagement resulting from military rule and corruption.

The failure of successive regimes in Nigeria to clearly understand the nature of the conflict being waged by Boko Haram in the North East Nigeria is a possible reason why the conflict continues to linger thus far. According to James Adewunmi Falode, in ‘The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis,’ the activities of Boko Haram in the region have highlighted the need for more counter-strategies, although he failed to mention the measures he believes could be employed to ensure victory over the insurgent group. Falode admits that the country having difficulties to defeat Boko Haram has security ramifications beyond Nigeria’s borders, especially for West Africa.

### **Intelligence in State Security**

Intelligence has been defined as discreet and secret information with currency and relevance. The ability to abstract, evaluate and understand such intelligence underlies its accuracy and true value ([www.globalconflictmaps.com](http://www.globalconflictmaps.com)). The term can be used with reference to business, military, economic or political decisions, but it is most commonly used for governmental, foreign and defence policies. Intelligence generally has a national security connotation and therefore it is shrouded in secrecy. In any state, there are institutions authorised by law to gather intelligence because of its significance for the state –

economically, politically, socially and militarily. Getting intelligence when done by states to spy on each other is called Espionage in international relations. The intelligence security agencies roles in every state are outlined by Dovydas Vitkauskas (1999), in his book 'The Role of a Security Intelligence Service in a Democracy.' He made a clear distinction between the workings of a security intelligence service in a totalitarian regime and a democratic one. He stated that historically, where a state was totalitarian, its leaders "knew how to rule with the help of the secret police, but not with the secret ballot (Vitkauskas, 1999:3)." A domestic security intelligence service in such a country was therefore a very important tool of the government aimed at repression and control of its own citizens. On the other hand, in a democratic state, he inferred that the principal task of the service is to defend the state against threats to its national security. Because those threats could often be covertly organized, the service needs intelligence to counter them.

The author observed that a security intelligence agency is in no way the only player in a complex system of intelligence service of modern democratic states. The duties of this service cuts across all government structures, defence, foreign affairs, immigrations, customs and trade, energy, transport, finance, health and so on. He added that the security intelligence services are part of the law enforcement institutions and work together with other agencies to prosecute individuals and groups that commit offences against national security. Another function is averting foreign-influenced activities in the country. Here the intelligence service works to protect sensitive national security information concerning political, economic, scientific or military affairs of the state – to thwart any act of espionage or sabotage. Combating terrorism, insurgency, subversion and emerging new threats are also the duties of the security intelligence services in any democracy.

However, as much as Intelligence can be a vital force in addressing conflict situations, for it to serve as a potent weapon against conflict, there must also be cooperation and synergy among all the intelligence agencies. In "Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995: The Role of the Intelligence and Security Services," a paper by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, identifies the mortal shortcomings of hoarding intelligence by security agencies, which is arguably why Srebrenica was an intelligence failure. The Bosnian war was a highly complex conflict situation, only similar on the religious front to the Boko Haram conflict. According to the authors of the paper, everyone spied on everyone (including the United Nations Protection Forces stationed in the country), which brought about a sense of moral consciousness. The down side of this being that the veracity of intelligence being peddled is in doubt due to mass proliferation of intelligence. This in turn mostly resulted in major fatal tactical and operational moves made by both the military and mission heads.

### **Theoretical Framework - Structural Functionalism**

This theory explains that societies or social systems have 'needs' and that we can explain institutions and practices in terms of the 'functions' they perform for the survival of the whole. The functionalist explanation is prevalent in all traditions in social sciences. The question of why certain institutions or patterns of relationships exist in society was raised by the French philosopher Comte Isidore-Auguste-Marie-Francois-Xavier (1798-1857), who

maintained that all of the institutions, beliefs and morals of society are interrelated as a whole and so the method of explaining the existence of any one item is to discover the law which governs the co-existence of all phenomena. Other prominent theorists include Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Emile Durkheim (1858 - 1917), Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), George Murdock (1897-1985) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884 - 1942), who sought to explain the existence of institutions and practices in terms of the needs or functional requisites which had to be met to maintain society. Functionalism primarily deals with large social units and attempts to understand how these units are interrelated. Functionalists work from a premise that these units strive to maintain a balance; order, equilibrium and homeostatis. As such, the social institution is connected to society and adapts to changes in the structure of the social environment.

This research puts attention on the functions of the primary institutions responsible for intelligence gathering and how they fare in ensuring long lasting peace in the North-East region and the federal republic of Nigeria at large. The knowledge of their basic functions is vital to our study because intelligence as understood is carried out under the cloak of secrecy due to its currency. There is therefore need to be aware of the institutions that have legitimacy for intelligence gathering, processing, analysing, consciously managing available information and the methods of using such intelligence managing conflicts generally and specifically in the North East region of Nigeria, which is the focus of this research.

### **Types and Characteristics of Intelligence**

According to Gookins, (2008:66) intelligence is “processed information resulting from a cycle of dynamics of tasking, exploitation and evaluation of sources with expected outcomes that can refute or authenticate existing belief or mindset”. These outcomes can be applied variously to mitigate or eliminate threats: shape opinions, promote causes, interests, control systems and or initiate ideas and processes. He concludes that while information is anything that can be known, intelligence is a refined subset that responds to specific policy requirements and stated needs.


Ransom (1958) identifies 3 types of intelligence classified according to their purpose: strategic, tactical and counter-intelligence. He then describes the intelligence process as involving several steps: tasking, collection, evaluation and production, and dissemination. Strategic intelligence is concerned with information required to establish the basis of long term national security policy; tactical intelligence, which is information relevant to current operations is often of a military nature. Finally, he recognizes that counter-intelligence is not only concerned with negating the enemy's intelligence efforts but also to produce valuable positive information about their capabilities and intentions. Intelligence must have several essential characteristics for it to be helpful to policymakers. Ideally, it will be relevant, timely accurate, complete, and unbiased. It must also be actionable (sometimes referred to as ‘tactical’ by intelligence officers) – that is, specific enough to allow policy officials to act upon the information (Loch, 2010:21)

### **The Intelligence Process**



Intelligence has traditionally been described as following a series of steps called the intelligence cycle (Clark, 2010:10). The intelligence cycle determines the daily activities of the Intelligence Community. It starts with the needs of the intelligence "consumers" such as policymakers, military officials, and other decision makers who need intelligence for their activities. These requirements are sorted and prioritized within the Intelligence Community and are used to drive the collection activities by the same Community. The cycle, as depicted in the figure below, is repeated until an intelligence requirement has been satisfied.

**FIG 1.1:** The Intelligence Process



**Source:** [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence\\_cycle/](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence_cycle/)

The process typically begins with *requirements, or needs* step, which amounts to a definition of the intelligence problem. Usually, it takes the form of a rather general question from an intelligence consumer (mostly Government, Military or Businesses). Then comes the *planning, or direction* – determining how other components of the process will address the problem. The planning and direction step sets the stage for the Intelligence Process. It is the springboard from which all Intelligence activities are launched and it is the foundation for the entire process. This portion of the process includes determining the information need, deciding how to collect that information, and setting a timetable for collecting the information. Generally, in such cases, the consumer has a requirement for a specific

product. That product may be a full report, a graphic image, or raw information that is collected, processed, and disseminated, but skips the analysis and production step. The process then proceeds to *collection*, or gathering information. Agents gather the raw data required to produce the finished product. Data collection is performed through five basic intelligence sources: Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The sources of the raw data may include, but are not limited to, news reports, aerial imagery, satellite imagery, and government and public documents. Along with these five sources, information can be taken from law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies, and the private sector. The purpose of this collection is to meet the defined tactical or strategic goal. After this, the information is *processed*. The raw data is converted into a comprehensible format that is usable for the production of the finished product. The processing and exploitation step involves the use of highly trained and specialized personnel and technologically sophisticated equipment to turn the raw data into usable and understandable information. Foreign language materials must be translated, encrypted signals must be decrypted, film or digital signals must be translated into visible imagery, and responses from HUMINT sources must be validated and organized into a report format ready for analysis and production (Clark, 2010:11).

The newly collected and processed material must be brought together with relevant historical material to create intelligence in an *analysis* phase. Integrate, evaluate, analyze, and prepare the processed information for inclusion in the finished product. This step transforms raw data into applicable products, separating “information” from “intelligence.” The analysis and production step also requires highly trained and specialized personnel (in this case, analysts) to give meaning to the intelligence and to prioritize it against known requirements. Synthesizing intelligence into a finished, actionable product makes the intelligence useful to the consumer. The final result of this process should be information that will prevent terrorist attacks or other criminal activities. This phase also typically includes a peer and supervisory review of the finished product. The finished intelligence must be *disseminated* to the consumer. Delivery of the finished product to the consumer that requested it and to others as applicable happens at this stage. The consumer that requested the information receives the finished product, usually via electronic transmission in a timely and credible manner. Dissemination of the information typically is accomplished through such means as websites, email, Web 2.0 collaboration tools, and hardcopy distribution or as briefings. The final, finished product is referred to as “finished intelligence.” After the product is disseminated, further gaps in the intelligence may be identified, and the intelligence cycle begins all over again.

Lowenthal (2006) added two more phases to the process to make it seven phases. He included the consumption and feedback phases, sometimes regarded in some sectors as evaluation. The evaluation phase is necessary to continually acquire feedback during the intelligence process and evaluate that feedback to refine each individual step and the cycle as a whole. Constant evaluation and feedback from consumers are extremely important to enable those involved in the intelligence process to adjust and refine their activities and

analysis to better meet the consumers' changing and evolving information needs. These steps help assess current and new information found, recognize weak areas and potential threats, and eliminate those identified weaknesses. He further added that dialogues between intelligence consumers and producers should occur before and continue even after the intelligence has been received.

He asserted however, that policy makers are not pressed into immediate action by the receipt of intelligence (depending on the type of intelligence). However, if and how they consume the intelligence is key (Lowenthal, 2006).

The intelligence process usually has a self-repeating process which is a continuous process. It usually consists of collection, evaluation, analysis and dissemination. For many years this process has been applied but it is hard to tell if this process meets today's needs. For instance, one of the biggest problems is that counter intelligence is missing in the cycle (Heibel, 2012). Critics of the traditional Intelligence process have asserted that it assumes the same process whatever the objective – regardless of complexity and cognitive demands (for example, in preparing a long-range assessment, a national intelligence estimate, a brief on a current situation, etc.). Also, the intelligence cycle complicates the tasks of recognizing where errors can occur – it is difficult to recognize the source of errors. It does not indicate who or what may affect the completion of a step and the resources needed to begin the next step (Frini and Boury-Brisset, 2011).

It is worthy of note that when the intelligence process works well, that is, when decision makers ask penetrating questions, when collectors are creative and successful, when analysts paint accurate pictures and when political pressures on intelligence agencies are at a minimum, when these conditions exist, intelligence can, and has made valuable contributions to national security in every state. However, when the process does not work well, national security may be diminished (Taylor, 2007).

### **Sources of Intelligence**

According to the Air University of the United States Air Force (USAF), there are 5 basic intelligence information sources. They include the following:

- I. **Human Intelligence (HUMINT)** refers to all information obtained directly from human sources. It includes a wide range of activities from direct reconnaissance and observation to the use of informants and spies. Clandestine source acquisition, overt data collection by civilian or military personnel, debriefing of foreign or local nationals, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services and so on, are some of the principal types of collection associated with HUMINT. HUMINT may provide such information as insights into adversary plans and intentions for target development, adversary deliberations and decisions for developing our own objectives, research and development goals and strategies, blueprints for weaponizing, et cetera. Some intelligence requirements can best be satisfied by human source exploitation.

- II. **Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)** includes information derived from intercepted communications, radar, and telemetry. It is a category of intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronics intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. Kahn (1967) asserted that signals intelligence is the most secretive and important source of intelligence.
- III. **Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)** is obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wave length, time dependent, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic). It employs a broad group of disciplines including nuclear, optical, radiofrequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. Examples of MASINT might be the distinctive radar signatures of specific types of aircraft or the composition of air and water samples.
- IV. **Open-Source Information (OSINT)** is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form. Newspapers, magazines, books, and foreign broadcasts make up the greatest volume of intelligence materials. Telephone directories, films, maps, and charts are also useful. Materials (particularly military and scientific journals) often represent an idealized rather than a real picture of a capability that is aspired to rather than possessed.
- V. **Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)** includes both overhead and ground imagery.

It is important to understand that information from collection sources is **information**, not intelligence. Raw information is often incomplete or (taken out of context or without understanding its origin and purpose) possibly misleading. It can be subject to misinterpretation, or just plain wrong. It only becomes **intelligence** after thorough verification and analysis.

### **Synopsis of the Nigerian Intelligence Architecture and Roles of each in Conflict.**

The defunct National Security Organisation (NSO), which was disbanded in 1986, came into existence as a consequence of the brutal assassination of former Head of State, Murtala Muhammed. The apparent gap in intelligence was a key factor that militated against synergy between military police and the populace (Ahanotu, 2015). The organisation was established via decree no. 16, of 1976 (Peters, 1986). At the time, intelligence was handled by a special branch of the Nigerian police (known as the "E" division) and external intelligence was handled by the ministry of external affairs. Accordingly, the NSO was formed to harmonize all intelligence from the civilian, military, domestic and foreign sources, while merging all their affected structures including the military (Ahanotu, 2015). However, as argued by Peters (1986), "the body not only lacked intelligence specialist, but also lacked clearly defined goals (p.152)." By 1986, Decree No. 19 (under Retired General Ibrahim Babangida Administration) formally abolished the NSO and created the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the State Security

Service (SSS). By virtue of the provisions of this decree, it meant that the Intelligence Agency had become decentralized. The State Security Service became saddled with the duty of prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime against internal security, protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria (Peters, 1986:154). The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) on its part was saddled with the responsibility "to provide an efficient system of obtaining military intelligence for the Armed Forces/Ministry of Defence ([www.dia.gov.ng](http://www.dia.gov.ng)).” The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is tasked with overseeing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

The foregoing is the makeup of the intelligence community in Nigeria and they have had major roles in managing the insurgency that has engulfed the North-Eastern Nigeria.

The Department of State Services (DSS/SSS) is tasked with the provision of intelligence to prevent or contain, or take urgent enforcement action to prevent or contain, any anticipated, projected or active matter that could remotely or directly harm the internal security of Nigeria. It takes a strategic action to address insurgency challenge within the borders of the country. The intelligence procured by the DSS is mostly strategic. It is required to establish the basis of long term national security policy. Also, given the evolving nature of the Boko Haram insurgency, especially with its international connections, it is important the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) takes the front seat in tracking the movement of people across border who might be extremists or have contacts with extremist groups from neighbouring states, North African states or states in the Middle East like Niger, Chad, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and so on. The NIA must also monitor the activities of Nigerian citizens living outside the country, as well as liaise with other necessary agencies to checkmate trafficking of weapons which could further sustain the terrorist activities. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) gathers Tactical Intelligence which is processed and analysed information relevant to current operations and is often military in nature.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Generally speaking, intelligence is necessary for early conflict resolution. It is vital to security planning and operations. It provides insights that can ensure the defeat of the adversary and helps government clearly defines desired end state and when that end state has been achieved. There is the need for intelligence agencies to focus their intelligence collection plan and structure towards the evaluation of contingency plans for the worst case scenarios and whereby such plans fail, intelligence gathering should be redirected towards promptly undertaking the subsequent measures:

- Carrying out an objective assessment of the causes of the crisis
- Determining whether the causes will have a long term effect or whether it would be a short term phenomena
- Projecting the most likely course of events.

Conclusively, this paper has made attempts at establishing the important roles undertaken by intelligence agencies in managing conflicts. While the Nigerian government

has made visible progress in its attempt to arrest the Boko Haram insurgency gripping the North East through various means including negotiation and military interventions, these successes could not have been possible without intelligence direction. Equally important is the study's contention that without government addressing the myriads of socio-economic challenges overwhelming the country, particularly in the North East region, conflicts will almost never cease as citizens will seek alternative means to earn a living, with diabolical groups on hand to provide tentative succour. This is a recipe for conflicts that defy intelligence. If intelligence gathering must make the desired impact in conflict management, the political will to act promptly without prejudice is required. Without political will on the part of primary intelligence consumers – policy makers or the tactical commanders – conflict management will be unsuccessful.

**This study recommends the following;**

**Engaging effective counter propaganda**

There is no doubt that one of the most potent tactics in the counterinsurgency strategy is the effective use of propaganda to counter insurgent hold on the population. By utilizing various means of propaganda, counterinsurgent strategies can effectively send direct messages to the people and turn them against the insurgents. The people's hearts and minds can be won with the use of propaganda, coupled with the necessary political and economic reforms.

**Clear definition of duties and responsibilities of the Intelligence agencies.**

Every intelligence agency in the country have been clearly designated with duties and responsibilities, however, there seems to be overlapping of responsibilities. The DSS which is vested with the responsibility to gather strategic intelligence within the confines of Nigeria should stick to it and not stray into the responsibility of other security agencies like the police or the DIA. Agencies should also not be used for personal vendetta by power brokers against their enemies. Synergy should be encouraged among these agencies instead of trying to outshine one another. If they work together, there would be minimal security lapses and intelligence failure. **Increased security budget**

The increasing nature of criminal activities and terrorist related activities across the globe has also warranted proportionate increase in the budget of security agencies in Nigeria. Despite the increase in security budget in Nigeria significantly over the years, the North East conflict shows the need to do more. A further increase in allocations is necessary to meet the rising demands for the procurement of modern day to prosecute wars, recruit new officers to complement existing ones given the increasing population of the country, train officers in modern day intelligence gathering techniques and so on.

**Socio-Economic Reforms**

The impoverishment of the North East region by deepening unemployment, extreme poverty, infrastructural decay; create condition for the Boko Haram insurgency. In view of

this, there is urgent need for the government to create jobs or engender an enabling environment where job creation by the private sector and the work culture of earning a living thrive. There is need for urgent reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure in towns, villages and farmlands. Also, there should be rehabilitation of traumatised citizens, in addition to industrial development. Education is paramount in moulding the mind of the children caught up in this terrifying environment. To that end, government has the need to establish new schools, refurbish the old and destroyed ones and also encourage the involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations in any way or form.

### **Improve Public Relations.**

In managing conflicts, intelligence agencies need to relate with the citizens in various capacities to gather information and observe interactions to understand the root cause of conflicts. However gathering reliable information requires cultivating a good relationship with the people. Therefore, there is need for intelligence agencies to build long lasting relationships with the people so their actions and motives are not seen as suspicious. The intelligence agencies in Nigeria have sadly become a pariah to the citizens because past regimes used them as tools for political intimidations instead of tools of national security.

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